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Kay: "Making Marriage and Divorce Safe for Women" Revisited

"MAKING MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE
SAFE FOR WOMEN"
REVISITED
Herma Hill Kay*
This timely and important symposium on Marriage, Democracy,
and Families examines in depth the implications for a democratic society
of the federal government's recently asserted interest in promoting
marriage as a way of combating poverty.' The government's interest in
marriage is not merely rhetorical. Among its other provisions, the 2003

Temporary Assistance for Needy Families ("TANF") welfare program
introduced into Congress last month 2 renews the 1996 measure and
includes appropriations of up to $1.5 billion to be allocated among the

states for programs promoting marriage among poor families.3 It is not
entirely clear, however, what model of marriage the government has
endorsed. Apart from a reference to "healthy marriages" in the
subsection on Family Support Services,4 the statute nowhere defines

*

Barbara Nachtrieb Armstrong Professor of Law, School of Law, University of California,

Berkeley; J.D., University of Chicago, 1959; B.A., Southern Methodist University, 1956. This
Article is based on the 2003 Sidney and Walter Siben Lecture, delivered at the Hofstra Law School
on March 14, 2003.
1. See 42 U.S.C. § 601(a) (2000) ("The purpose of this part is to increase the flexibility of
States in operating a program designed to... (2) end the dependence of needy parents on
government benefits by promoting job preparation, work, and marriage.").
2. See Robert Pear, House Endorses Stricter Work Rules for Poor, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 14,
2003, at A25 (noting that the House passed the bill by a vote of 230 to 192 on February 13, 2003,
generally along party lines).
3. See Michael Tanner, Wedded to Poverty, N.Y. TIMES, July 29, 2003, at A27 (questioning
whether this program will help its intended beneficiaries: poor single mothers on welfare).
4. See 42 U.S.C. § 629a(a)(2) (Supp. 2003). The subsection states:
The term "family support services" means community-based services to promote the
safety and well-being of children and families designed to increase the strength and
stability of families (including adoptive, foster, and extended families), to increase
parents' confidence and competence in their parenting abilities, to afford children a safe,
stable, and supportive family environment, to strengthen parental relationships and
promote healthy marriages, and otherwise to enhance child development.
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marriage. In this Article, I will argue that if the government's preferred
model is that of traditional marriage, its goal is inconsistent with the
ideal of equality that should permeate a democratic society, and
accordingly should not be imposed on poor families as a component part
of their receiving welfare.
I.

INTRODUCTION: DIVORCE REFORM AS PRELUDE TO RE-EXAMINING
MARRIAGE

Marriage law in the United States is currently undergoing fresh
evaluation at the state level. Paradoxically, the most recent legislative
efforts to modernize marriage law began in the 1960s as a by-product of
the divorce reform movement. Nearly forty years ago, on January 8,
1964, the California Legislature opened a series of hearings to determine
how the state's divorce laws functioned in practice.5 One of the first
witnesses offered a different perspective on what poor families needed
than the view presently held by the federal government. Mr. Harold E.
Simmons, representing the Director of the California Department of
Social Welfare, urged legislative funding for divorce, rather than for
marriage.6 Specifically, he noted that the Department was working with
a group of approximately seven hundred welfare families in which the
father wanted to divorce a former wife in order to marry the woman with
whom he was currently living in order to legitimate the children born of
their non-marital relationship.7 Mr. Simmons suggested that the
Id. It is possible that § 3 of the Defense of Marriage Act ("DOMA"), Pub. L. No. 104-199, § 3(a),
110 Stat. 2419 (1996) (codified at I U.S.C. § 7 (2000)), supplies Temporary Assistance for Needy
Families' ("TANF") with a definition of marriage. Section 7 provides:
In determining the meaning of any Act of Congress, or of any ruling, regulation, or
interpretation of the various administrative bureaus and agencies of the United States, the
word "marriage" means only a legal union between one man and one woman as husband
and wife, and the word "spouse" refers only to a person of the opposite sex who is a
husband or a wife.
I U.S.C. § 7. The 1996 version of TANF became effective July 1, 1997. I have argued elsewhere
that § 3 was "ill-advised" because it
[C]hanges a uniform and long-standing federal practice of deferring to state law on
questions affecting the family.... This long-standing practice appropriately recognizes
the prerogative of state legislatures to regulate the family as a matter of local policy, and
the greater experience of state court judges, charged with implementing the state laws
governing family dissolution as well as matrimony, in determining marital status.
Henna Hill Kay, Same-Sex Marriagein the Conflict of Laws: A Critique of the Proposed "Defense
of MarriageAct," in THE CIVIL LAW IN THE 21 ST CENTURY 902, 905-06 (1996).

5.
Jan. 8-9,
6.
7.

See Cal. Assembly Interim Comm. on Judiciary, Transcript of Proceedings (Los Angeles,
1964) (copy on file in Professor Kay's office).
Seeid.at82-91.
See id. at 82.
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legislature might accomplish this goal by appropriating funds for legal
services programs to enable them to secure the necessary divorces. 8
At the time of these hearings, California in common with nearly all
other states recognized only children born to married parents as
legitimate at birth. 9 Moreover, its model of legal marriage was one in
which marital functions were assigned by sex between the spouses. The
roots of this model extended to English law. As Professor Homer H.
Clark, Jr., a noted family law expert, put it in 1968,
Anglo-American law has for centuries prescribed rules for the proper
behavior of husbands and wives in marriage. These rules ... say that
the husband has a duty to support his wife, that she has a duty to render
services in the home, and that these duties are reciprocal. In a sense
such a statement is misleading, because rules take on a different aspect
when one examines the remedies existing for their enforcement and the
circumstances in which they operate.... But these rules acquire much
of their force and vitality from the fact that they construct a model of
correct behavior. They are moral precepts ...
Another comfortable feature of these rules is their extraordinary
conservatism. They describe the traditional roles of husband and wife.
The husband is to provide the family with food, clothing, shelter and as
many of the amenities of life as he can manage, either (in earlier days)
by the management of his estates or (more recently) by working for
wages or a salary. The wife is to be mistress of the household,
maintaining the home with the resources furnished by the husband, and
caring for the children. A reading of contemporary judicial opinions
leaves the impression that these roles have not changed over the last
two hundred years, in spite of the changes in the legal position of the
married woman carried through in the Nineteenth Century and in her
social and economic position in this century. One can only account for
the tenacity of the rules on the theory that since they express moral
precepts backed up by religious teachings they are independent of
time, place and circumstances. Their conservatism is reinforced by the
to treat
reciprocal nature of the duties imposed, making it easier
0
deviations as evidence of moral fault and of breach of faith.'

8. See id. at 83-84.
9. Children born out of wedlock could be legitimated by the marriage of their parents, or
under some circumstances, by the father's public acknowledgment of the child. See HOMER H.
CLARK, JR., THE LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES § 5.2, at 158 (1968). The
mother, acting alone, could not legitimate a child born illegitimate. See id. at 159.
10. Id. § 6.1 (footnotes omitted).
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The legal structure of the Anglo-American model of marriage was
more agreeable for men than for women. Its division of labor by sex was
reinforced not only by moral precepts, but also by economic and social
arrangements that gave men priority over women in the workplace and
that deprived women of the power to control their reproductive capacity.
Under these circumstances, marriage was not only the most readily
available opportunity for women, it was often the only feasible choice,
particularly for middle and upper class women.
During those early California hearings, however, a seed was
planted that ultimately flowered into a new approach to divorce law. The
idea of eliminating fault as the basis for marriage dissolution, spousal
support, property division, and child custody adjudication was proposed
there." Although the California legislature did not act on any of those
proposals at that time,' 2 the hearings nonetheless provided the
opportunity for a small interdisciplinary group of professionals in
northern California to come together in support of divorce law reform. In
1966, Governor Edmund G. "Pat" Brown appointed several members of
this group to his Governor's Commission on the Family. 13 That
Commission's Report, after further study by the Family Law Committee
of the State Bar of California, became the basis of the nation's first nofault divorce bill that was enacted by the California legislature in 1969,
14
and signed into law by Governor Ronald Reagan.
Meanwhile, a national study of marriage and divorce law had been
underway since 1965 under the leadership of Professor Robert J. Levy,
sponsored by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws ("NCCUSL"). 15 That study culminated in the 1970 draft of
the Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act, which also recommended nofault divorce.16 Following a two-year struggle between the NCCUSL and
the American Bar Association's ("ABA") Committee on Family Law

11. See HERBERT JACOB, SILENT REVOLUTION: THE TRANSFORMATION OF DIVORCE LAW IN
THE UNITED STATES 52-53 (1988); Herma Hill Kay, From the Second Sex to the Joint Venture: An
Overview of Women's Rights and Family Law in the United States During the Twentieth Century,

88 CAL. L. REV. 2017, 2050-51 (2000); Howard A. Krom, California'sDivorce Law Reform: An
HistoricalAnalysis, I PAC. L.J. 156, 156 (1970).

12.
13.
14.
15.
16.

See Krom, supra note 11, at 170-71.
See Kay, supranote 11, at 2050.
See id. at 2052; see also Krom, supra note 11, at 180.
See Kay, supranote 11, at 2055.
See id
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over the statement of the no-fault principle, a less innovative draft was
approved by the ABA and promulgated by the NCCUSL in 1973.'7
Thus, at the time I published my 1972 book review essay, Making
Marriageand Divorce Safe for Women, 18 the first round of divorce law
reform had largely been completed. The essay was a review of an
important book by my family law professor, Max Rheinstein of the
University of Chicago.' 9 After thirty more years of work and reflection
on this subject, I want to revisit the ideas and arguments put forth in that
essay with you today.
II.

LEGAL MARRIAGE THEN AND Now: A THIRTY YEAR
REASSESSMENT

Rheinstein's view of divorce, like that expressed at the California
hearings by Mr. Harold E. Simmons on behalf of the Department of
Social Welfare, was an instrumental one. "[T]he very purpose... a
divorce law ought to pursue," he said, is "that of facilitating
remarriage., 20 Taking issue with that statement, I argued that
Rheinstein's point that legal divorce should be seen only as a
readmission ticket to the "freedom of the marriage market" still
assumes that remarriage is the happy ending to the status of divorce.
Yet this assumption is being questioned, at least for women, by those
who are concerned with the social and legal position of women.
Marriage itself, let alone remarriage, is being viewed as a limitation on
the woman who seeks to realize her 2own
individuality rather than
1
achieving identity through her husband.
In exploring why many women might not see remarriage as their
best option following divorce, I set out three major categories of feminist
criticism of traditional marriage, identified as "(1) financial problems,
including the obligation of support and property rights; (2) the identity

17. See id. at 2056-57; see generally Robert J. Levy, A Reminiscence About the Uniform
Marriage and Divorce Act-and Some Reflections About Its Critics and Its Policies, 1991 BYU L.
REV. 43 (1991).
18. See Herma Hill Kay, Making Marriage and Divorce Safe for Women, 60 CAL. L. REV.

1683 (1972) (book review).
19.

See MAX RHEINSTEIN, MARRIAGE STABILITY, DIVORCE, AND THE LAW (1972).

20. Id. at 124 (adding that "[b]y its very essence[,] a divorce is a restoration of the parties to
the freedom of remarriage. Early remarriage creates the chance of marital satisfaction for both
parties and a new home for the children that will be presumably more harmonious than the former
one.").
21. Kay, supra note 18, at 1685 (footnotes omitted).
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of the married woman,
encompassing name, domicile, and occupation;
22
childrearing.',
and (3)
Thirty years of agitation by women's groups and their male allies,
scholarship and criticism by feminist legal scholars of both sexes,
legislative reform often led by female politicians and supported by their
male colleagues, and litigation by public interest groups and private
parties have produced positive changes in all three of these categories. I
will briefly review the most significant developments.
A.

MarriageLaw Reform

1. Financial Problems
In 1972, the laws in every state placed the primary obligation of
family support upon the husband.23 As I noted, this allocation of support
by sex carried with it at least three implications for the position of
women in marriage: 1) the legal view that the married woman was an
economically nonproductive person dependent upon others for the
necessities of life; 2) that the wife's work in the home was a service she
owes to her husband, rather than a job deserving the dignity of economic
return; and 3) that the housewife cannot provide for her old age, since
she cannot contribute to social security and has no pension or retirement
plan.24
Today, the obligation of support during marriage has become
gender-neutral, a position which recognizes that the majority of wives
living with their husbands are in the labor force.25 The homemaking
wife's work in the home, however, is still not a paying job capable of
both producing current income and generating the right to retirement
with an old age pension.
The married woman's right to property acquired during the
marriage has been more resistant to change than her support obligation.
It remains true now, as in 1972, that "[o]nly in the... community
property states does each spouse acquire a vested interest in property

22. Id. at 1690.
23. See id.
24. See id.at 1690-92.
25.

See U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, CENSUS BUREAU, SERIES P-20, No. 537, AMERICA'S

FAMILIES
AND
LIVING
ARRANGEMENTS
13
(2001)
available
at
http://www.census.gov/prod/2001pubs/p20-537.pdf. (reporting that 60.3 percent of married women
living with their husbands participated in the labor force in 2000). In 1971 almost three-fifths of the
31.5 million women in the labor force were married women living with their husbands. See U.S.
DEP'T OF LABOR, WOMEN'S BUREAU, BULLETIN NO. 3119, WOMEN WORKERS TODAY (1971).
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earned by the other during the marriage. 26 The only difference is that
the number of community property states has increased from eight to
nine with the addition of Wisconsin, which in 1984 became the only
common law state to adopt a community property system.27 Between
1972 and 1980, all of the eight original community property states
enlarged the wife's power to manage and control the community
property,28 but in some states this power is more theoretical than real
during the existence of the marriage. 9 While by 1987 all of the common
law states had adopted an equitable distribution approach to the division
of marital property upon divorce,3 ° these states have not accorded the
homemaking spouse the dignity of shared ownership of property
acquired during the marriage.
2. Women's Identity
The greatest changes of the past thirty years have occurred in the
laws that formerly prevented the married woman from establishing her
own identity: age at marriage, married name, and legal domicile. In
1972, women were free to marry at eighteen, men not until twenty-one, a
legal distinction that suggested "to young women that marriage is their
proper life's choice and that education for future careers should be
reserved for men. 3 1 While the norm for first marriages in the United
States is still characterized by a husband who is approximately two years
older than his wife, the legal age of marriage is now eighteen for both
sexes. 32 Of more significance is the fact that in recent years, both men

26. Kay, supra note 18, at 1692.
27. See Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 766.001-766.97 (West 2001) (originally enacted as Act of April
4, 1984, ch. 186, 47, 1983 Wis. Laws 1153, 1163-75); Kathleen M. O'Connor, Note, Marital
Property Reform in Massachusetts:A Choice for the New Millennium, 34 NEW ENG. L. REv. 261,

280 (1999). For a perceptive account of the effort that accompanied this enactment, see June Miller
Weisberger, The Wisconsin Marital Property Act: Highlights of the Wisconsin Experience in
Developing a Model for Comprehensive Common Law Property Reform, 1 WIS. WOMEN'S L.J. 5

(1985).
28. See O'Connor, supranote 27, at 280.
29. See HERMA HILL KAY & MARTHA S. WEST, TEXT, CASES AND MATERIALS ON SEXBASED DISCRIMINATION 270-73 (5th ed. 2002).

30. See American Law Institute, Principlesof the Law of Family Dissolution: Analysis and
Recommendations, 8 DUKE J. GENDER LAW & POL'Y 1, 20 (2001); Doris Jonas Freed & Timothy B.

Walker, Family Law in the Fifty States: An Overview, 22 FAM. L.Q. 367, 476 (1989).
31. Kay, supranote 18, at 1693.
32. See US Teen Marriage License Laws, at http://marriage.about.com/library/bllteen.htm
(last visited Sept. 20, 2003) (noting that Nebraska is the only state that sets the legal age of marriage
without parental permission at nineteen).
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and women have postponed marriage further into their twenties. In 1970,
the median age of marriage for males in the United States was 23.2, and
for females 20.8, while in 2000 these medians had risen to 26.8 and 25.1
respectively.33
Thirty years ago, a woman customarily exchanged her surname for
that of her husband upon marriage. 34 Although the extent to which this
practice was compelled by law rather than dictated by social custom
remains unclear,35 it is clear that more options are available to married
women today. Among these options are retaining her birth name, using a
hyphenated name composed of her birth name and her husband's
surname, and creating a fused name.36 Still controversial in some states
is the matter of whether a divorced father may compel the child to
continue to use his
name, rather than the name the mother has assumed
37
after remarriage.
Rules determining a married woman's legal domicile have proven
more resistant to change. Traditionally, a wife took her husband's
domicile upon marriage, 38 but she could acquire a separate domicile by
living apart from him if she was not guilty of desertion.3 9 More recently,
the common law rule has been recognized to be "clearly inconsistent
with contemporary views relating to the legal position of married
women." 40 Accordingly, the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws
("Restatement Second") was revised in 1988 to provide that "[t]he rules
for the acquisition of a domicil[e] of choice are the same for both
married and unmarried persons. 'A4 This position does not squarely reject
the common law rule. Rather, it appears to assume that if a married

33. See U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, supra note 25, at 9.
34. See William C. Matthews, Comment, Married Women and the Name Game, 11 U. RICH.
L. REV. 121, 129-32 (1976).
35. See Priscilla Ruth MacDougall, The Right of Women to Determine Their Own Names
Irrespective of Marital Status, I FAM. L. REP. 4005, 4006 (1974); see also Kay, supra note 18, at

1693-94.
36. See Priscilla Ruth MacDougall, Women's, Men's, Children's Names: An Outline and
Bibliography, 7 FAM. L. REP. 4013, 4013-14 (1981).
37. See Leadingham ex rel. Smith v. Smith, 56 S.W.3d 420 (Ky. Ct. App. 2001) (denying

petition of twelve year old child of divorced parents whose mother had remarried and assumed her
second husband's name to change her name from her father's name to a hyphenated name
composed of the surnames of her father and step-father); see generally Merle H. Weiner, "We Are
Family": Valuing Associationalism in Disputes Over Children's Surnames, 75 N.C. L. REV. 1625
(1997) (footnote omitted).
38. See RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 27 cmt. b (1934).

39. See id. § 28.
40.
41.

See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 21 cmt. a (1971 & 1988 Revision).
Id.§21.
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woman's domicile is changed by operation of law to that of her husband
because of their marriage, she has the option of changing it back to her
former domicile or of choosing another domicile. Even this possibility is
limited, however, by the Restatement Second's observation that since
most married couples live in the same place, they will continue to have
the same domicile.42 It is questionable whether this observation
adequately meets the needs of couples engaged in today's dual career
commuting marriages.
3. Childrearing
In 1972, I identified a "cluster of laws that make mothers primarily
responsible for childrearing. ' '43 These included job discrimination
against mothers, the inadequate availability of childbearing and
childrearing leaves of absence, meager tax support for child care
expenses, and the absence of any governmental plan to facilitate labor
market entry and job continuity for mothers of young children. 44 Despite
improvements in the legal regulation of these matters, it remains true
today that our culture identifies mothers, rather than fathers, as the
primary caretakers of infants and pre-school aged children. For example,
a recent study based on data from the National Institute of Child Health
and Human Development Study of Early Child Care reported that threeyear-old children whose mothers had worked more than thirty hours per
week by the time the child was nine months old did not do as well on
school-readiness tests as children whose mothers did not work during the
same period. 45 The headline to this story, as reported in the New York
Times, was "Study Links Working Mothers to Slower Learning. 46 The
story did not indicate whether fathers were present in the home, nor, if
they were, what their work schedules might have been. The Family and
Medical Leave Act of 199347 does not restrict its provisions to mothers,

42. See id. § 21 cmt. a.
43. Kay, supranote 18, at 1695.
44. See id. at 1695-96.
45. See Jeanne Brooks-Gunn et al., MaternalEmployment and Child Cognitive Outcomes in
the First Three Years of Life: The NICHD Study of Early Child Care, 73 CHILD DEV. 1052, 1064
(2002) (reporting that three year olds from an average home environment in average-quality child
care whose mothers did not work by the ninth month scored at the fiftieth percentile on the Bracken
School Readiness test, while children in similar settings whose mothers worked by the ninth month
scored at the forty-fourth percentile).
46. See Tamar Lewin, Study Links Working Mothers to Slower Learning, N.Y. TIMES, July
17, 2002, at A14.
47. See Family and Medical Leave Act, Pub. L. No. 103-3 (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 26012654 (2000)).
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but given that it provides only job security and not paid leave, the
continuing wage gap between women and men tends to make its benefits
more attractive to mothers than fathers.
B. Reforms in Laws ImpactingMarriage
In reviewing Rheinstein's book, I recognized that reform of the
laws directly regulating marriage was not sufficient to achieve lasting
change. I argued "that a close union must now be formed between the
women's movement and the reformers of marriage and divorce laws if
the legal framework surrounding the American family is truly to be
restructured to provide an institution capable of supporting the fullest
possible self-realization of all its members. 48 Although it took some
time for that coalition to be formed, 49 and while there were sharp
disagreements along the way,50 members of both groups ultimately were
able to support broader changes in the laws related to marriage and the
status of married women. The past thirty years have seen substantial
reforms in areas of law that impact on marriage. Three are of paramount
importance: (1) laws prohibiting sex discrimination in the market place;
(2) the married woman's increased ability to control her reproductive
capacity through contraception and abortion, or to extend it by using
new medical techniques of assisted conception; and (3) laws prohibiting
marital rape and seeking to control domestic violence. Virtually none of
these laws were in place in January of 1964, when the California
legislature began its inquiry into divorce. At that time, the Equal Pay
Act, which prohibited employers from paying women less than men "for
equal work on jobs[,] the performance of which requires equal skill,
effort, and responsibility, and which are performed under similar
working conditions," 5' had been in force for only about one year. Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act,52 which ultimately prohibited sex

48.

Kay, supra note 18, at 1685.

49. See Deborah L. Rhode & Martha Minow, Reforming the Questions, Questioning the
Reforms, in DIVORCE REFORM AT THE CROSSROADS 191, 195 (Stephen D. Sugarman & Herma Hill

Kay eds., 1990).
50. See generally Martha L. Fineman, Implementing Equality: Ideology, Contradiction and
Social Change:A Study of Rhetoric and Results in the Regulationof the Consequences of Divorce,
1983 Wis. L. REV. 789 (1983)

51. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1) (2000) (effective June 10, 1963). In 1978, President Carter
transferred enforcement authority over the Equal Pay Act from the Secretary of Labor to the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-4 (2000) (containing the message of
the President which transfers enforcement authority).
52. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-15 (2000 & Supp. 2003). Title VII became effective on
July 2, 1964.
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discrimination in employment, was still under consideration by
Congress. Women were hampered in their work force participation and
in their career planning by the uncertainty of pregnancy. As in most
states, legal abortion was available in California only when the
procedure was necessary to preserve the life of the mother. 3
Contraception, where available, was less than totally reliable, and the
birth control pill had only recently been introduced in 1960. 54 Domestic
violence was not yet on the agenda of law reform, and no state had
enacted a law protecting a wife against unwanted sexual intercourse with
her husband. 5
Today, while a woman's constitutional right to decide whether to
have an abortion remains at risk of pro-life judicial appointments to the
United States Supreme Court, the law in all three of these areas has
changed in ways that are substantially more supportive of equality
between men and women in marriage. Except for marital rape reforms,
these developments apply both to single and married woman. Given the
focus of this paper, however, I will limit the ensuing discussion to the
impact of these changes on married women.
1. Sex Discrimination in Employment
As noted above, federal legislation was enacted in the early 1960s
that ensured women equal pay for equal work, and more broadly
outlawed discrimination based on sex.56 While implementation of these
laws has been somewhat uneven, in general they have been successful in
eliminating the classification of many blue collar jobs as "male" and
"female" and in opening opportunities in higher level jobs to women.
Where a woman's traditional role as a mother is seen to conflict with her
labor market activity, however, the path to equal treatment has been less
direct. Early court interpretation of the prohibition against sex
discrimination in Title VII of the Civil Rights Act faltered over problems
of interpretation which suggested that some judges were unclear on the
statutory concept. Thus, when an employer's practice of hiring fathers
but not mothers of pre-school age children was challenged as a violation
of Title VII, there was some confusion regarding whether the

53. See Kay, supra note 11, at 2057.
54.
55.

See BERNARD ASBELL, THE PILL 61-81, 167 (1995).
See Lalenya Weintraub Siegel, Note, The Marital Rape Exemption: Evolution to

Extinction, 43 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 351, 352 n.5 (stating that in 1976 Nebraska became the first state
to remove the marital exemption from its rape statute in NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 28-319 (Michie
1995)).
56. See supra text accompanying notes 50-51.
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discrimination was based on "sex" or "motherhood., 57 The plaintiff, Ida
Phillips, the mother of a pre-school age child, applied but was not hired
for the position of "Assembly Trainee.,, 58 The defendant, Martin
Marietta Corporation, showed that approximately seventy-five to eighty
percent of its employees holding this position were women.5 9 It argued
that it had not failed to hire plaintiff because of her sex. 60 The district
court agreed, as did a panel of the Fifth Circuit, with the latter reasoning
that:
The evidence presented in the trial court is quite convincing that no
discrimination against women as a whole or the appellant individually
was practiced by Martin Marietta. The discrimination was based on a
two-pronged qualification, i.e., a woman with pre-school age children.
Ida Phillips was not refused employment because she was woman nor
because she had pre-school age children. It is the coalescence
of these
61
two elements that denied her the position she desired.
Judge Brown, dissenting from the court's refusal to grant rehearing
en banc, quickly exposed the fallacy in the panel's reasoning. He
observed:
The case is simple. A woman with pre-school children may not be
employed, a man with pre-school children may. The distinguishing
factor seems to be motherhood versus fatherhood. The question then
arises: Is this sex-related? To the simple query, the answer is just as
simple: Nobody-and this includes Judges, Solomonic or life
tenured-has yet seen a male mother. A6 mother, to oversimplify the
simplest biology, must then be a woman. 2
The United States Supreme Court vacated in a terse per curiam
decision which held that a per se violation of the Act had been shown,
but left open the disturbing possibility that the employer might prevail
on remand if it could show that the "existence of such conflicting family
obligations, if demonstrably more relevant to job performance for a
woman than for a man," might constitute "'a bona fide occupational
qualification [("BFOQ")] reasonably necessary to the normal operation

57.
(1971).
58.
59.
60.

See Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 411 F.2d 1, 2 (5th Cir. 1969), vacated,400 U.S. 542
See id.
at2.
See id.
See id.

61. Id.at4.
62. Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 416 F.2d 1257, 1259 (footnote omitted) (5th Cir. 1969)
(Brown, C.J., dissenting from denial of rehearing).
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of that particular business or enterprise"' under § 703(e) of the Act. 63
Justice Marshall, concurring, accurately identified the danger in the
Court's dictum:
I cannot agree ...that a... showing that some women, even the vast
majority, with pre-school-age children have family responsibilities that
interfere with job performance and that men do not usually have such
responsibilities [could establish a BFOQ exception]. Certainly, an
employer can require that all of his employees, both men and women,
meet minimum performance standards, and he can try to insure
compliance by requiring parents, both mothers and fathers, to provide
for the care of their children so that job performance is not interfered
with.
But the Court suggests that it would not require such uniform
standards. I fear that in this case, where the issue is not squarely before
us, the Court has fallen into the trap of assuming that the Act permits
ancient canards about the proper role of women to be a basis64 for
discrimination. Congress, however, sought just the opposite result.
Fortunately, the BFOQ exception has not been expanded as broadly
as Justice Marshall feared. In 1991, the Court refused to apply the BFOQ
exception to permit a manufacturer of batteries to exclude as employees,
who would be exposed to lead in the manufacturing process, fertile
women but not fertile men. 65 While a few of the Court's Title VII
decisions over the years have been marred by its failure to identify
discrimination based on sex in employment practices that impinge on
women's traditional role as caregivers of children,66 still that statute and
the state laws that have followed in its wake have purged the work place
of the most explicit forms of sex discrimination.
2. Control of the Body
Over a twelve year period between the mid-1960s through the late
1970s, the United States Supreme Court issued a series of decisions
creating and applying a right of privacy to matters affecting the
conception and birth of children. In 1965, the Court recognized the right
63.

Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542, 544 (1971).

64.

Id. at 544-45 (Marshall, J., concurring).

65. See Int'l Union v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187, 203-06 (1991).
66. See, e.g., General Electric Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 134-35 (1976) (holding that an
employer's failure to cover pregnancy in its employee health insurance plan did not constitute sex
discrimination under Title VII because the statutory classification was drawn between "pregnant
women" and "nonpregnant persons" rather than between women and men) (quoting Geduldig v.
Aiello, 417 U.S. 484, 496-97 & n.20 (1974).
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of a married couple to implement family planning decisions through the
use of contraceptives.6 7 The Court based its holding on "notions of
privacy surrounding the marriage relationship" that prevented the
government from implementing an anti-contraception policy by allowing
"the police to search the sacred precincts of marital bedrooms for telltale
signs of the use of contraceptives." 68 In 1973, a 7-2 majority of the Court
recognized that this same right of privacy was "broad enough to
encompass a woman's decision whether or not to terminate her
pregnancy. ' 69 In 1976, a 6-3 majority of the Court conferred authority on
the pregnant woman to make this decision even if her husband
objected.7 ° In 1977, over the dissent of Chief Justice Rehnquist, the
Court held that "the constitutionally protected right of privacy extends to
an individual's liberty to make choices regarding contraception, 7 1 thus
announcing a holding consistent with its earlier dictum that "[i]f the
right of privacy means anything, it is the right of the individual, married
or single, to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into
matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether to
bear or beget a child. 7 2
In 1992, fifteen years after the last of these cases was decided, a
plurality of the Court rejected the "trimester" approach to abortion
regulation set forth in Roe v. Wade7 3 in favor of reaffirming its
"essential" or "central" holding regarding the woman's liberty interest
by establishing a bright line at viability coupled with an "undue burden"
standard for determining the woman's right to decide.7 4 Justice Sandra
Day O'Connor, writing for the Court, and Chief Justice William
Rehnquist, writing for four dissenters, disagreed sharply over the impact
of the Roe decision on the role of women in society. Justice O'Connor
observed in discussing the precedential importance of Roe that "[a]n
entire generation has come of age free to assume Roe's concept of

67. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
68. Id. at 485-86.
69. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973).
70. See Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 71 (1976) (reasoning that:
[W]hen the wife and husband disagree on this decision, the view of only one of the two
marriage partners can prevail. Inasmuch as it is the woman who physically bears the
child and who is the more directly and immediately affected by the pregnancy, as

between the two, the balance weighs in her favor).
71.
72.
73.
74.

Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 685 (1977).
Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972) (Brennan, J.).
SeeRoe,410 U.S. at 164-65.
See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 846, 878-79 (1992).
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liberty in defining the capacity of women to act in society, and to make
reproductive decisions., 75 The Chief Justice disagreed. In his view,
[s]urely it is dubious to suggest that women have reached their "places
in society" in reliance upon Roe, rather than as a result of their
determination to obtain higher education and compete with men in the
job market, and of society's increasing recognition of their ability to
fill positions that were previously thought to be reserved only for
men. 76
The Chief Justice seems impervious to the disruptive effect of
unplanned and irreversible pregnancy upon the women whose
achievements he applauds. Without the security of reproductive control,
the ability of women to plan their lives according to their abilities and
aspirations would be severely restricted. Two thoughtful observers have
characterized the differences between the type of reasoning employed by
O'Connor and that used by Rehnquist as that "between deductive and
inductive, contextual and generalizing, and relational and rule-based
reasoning modes. 77 They observe that "Justice O'Connor's intellectual
versatility suggests a capacity to overcome dissociation and use a full
range of reasoning and problem solving modes. 78 Nonetheless, they
warn that:
The Court cannot give appropriate effect to the Fourteenth
Amendment's mandate to protect the generalized right of personhood
in the reproductive rights context unless it develops a particularized
and respectful appreciation of the perspectives of pregnant women.
Should the Court fail to address and appreciate the perspective of the
pregnant woman or to focus on her as a decision maker, its undue
burden test will prove too 79feeble to guarantee the full personhood that
the Amendment promises.
This warning comes at an appropriate moment. Today, this
guarantee is endangered. Following its decision in Casey, a 5-4 majority
of the Supreme Court adopted the "undue burden" test. 80 New
75. Id. at 860.
76. Id. at 956-57 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
77. Peggy Cooper Davis & Carol Gilligan, A Woman Decides: Justice O'Connor and Due
Process Rights of Choice, 32 McGEORGE L. REv. 895, 900 (2000).
78. Id.
79. Id. at911.
80. See Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 922, 930 (2000) (invalidating, by a 5-4 vote, a
Nebraska law banning "partial birth" abortions). The U.S. Senate voted 64-34 to outlaw partial-birth
abortion on October 21, 2003; President Bush has promised to sign the measure. See Sheryl Gay
Stolberg, Senate Approves Bill to Prohibit Type ofAbortion, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 22, 2003, at Al.
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appointments on the Supreme Court are widely expected to occur before
the end of the present administration. 8' In 2002, my home state of
California enacted legislation to safeguard a woman's right to choose
whether to terminate her pregnancy under state law even if the federal
constitutional protection is dissolved.82 Other states should follow suit.
3. Marital Rape and Domestic Violence
In 1984, the New York Court of Appeals became the first state high
court to declare unconstitutional the husband's statutory marital
exemption from the offense of raping his wife. 3 In the course of his
scholarly opinion for a unanimous court, Judge Wachtler traced the
exemption's origin to a statement by the seventeenth century English
jurist, Lord Hale, who wrote, "[T]he husband cannot be guilty of a rape
committed by himself upon his lawful wife, for by their mutual
matrimonial consent and contract the wife hath given up herself in this
kind unto her husband, which she cannot retract."8 4 The court also noted
that over forty states retained some form of marital exemption for rape. 5
Today, although sixteen states and the District of Columbia have
followed New
York's lead, either by judicial decision or statutory
86
enactment,

A majority of states still retain some form of the common law regime:
They criminalize a narrower range of offenses if committed within-...
marriage, subject the marital rape they do recognize to less serious
create special procedural hurdles for marital rape
sanctions, and/or
7
prosecutions.8

Domestic violence is not, of course, an entirely separate topic from
marital rape. One study found that in thirty-seven percent of marriages
where violence was present, the wives had been both beaten and raped

81. See Kenneth L. Manning et al., George W. Bush's Potential Supreme Court Nominees:
What Impact Might They Have?, 85 JUDICATURE 278 (2002).
82. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 123460-123468 (West Supp. 2003) (providing in
§ 123466 that "[t]he state may not deny or interfere with a woman's right to choose or obtain an
abortion prior to the viability of the fetus, or when the abortion is necessary to protect the life or
health of the woman").
83. See People v. Liberta, 474 N.E.2d 567, 578-79 (1984).
84. Id. at 572 (quoting I SIR MATTHEW HALE, HISTORY OF PLEAS OF THE CROWN 629 (P.R.
Glazebrook ed., Prof lBooks Ltd. 1971) (1736)) (alteration in original).
85. See id.
86. See Linda D. Elrod & Robert G. Spector, A Review of the Year in Family Law: State
Courts React to Troxel, 35 FAM. L.Q. 577, Chart 8 (2002).
87. See Jill Elaine Hasday, Contest and Consent: A Legal History of Marital Rape, 88 CAL. L.

REv. 1373, 1375 (2000) (citations omitted).
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by their husbands.88 What has come to be known as "woman abuse,"
however, goes beyond rape and includes all forms of battering, both
physical and psychological. 89 Today, it "is the single largest cause of
injury to women in the United States." 90 Despite the prevalence of
domestic violence, no effective means of controlling and punishing it
has emerged. 9' The civil remedy provision of the Violence Against
Women Act of 199492 was invalidated by the Supreme Court as beyond
the power of Congress to implement the Fourteenth Amendment and not
within its power to regulate commerce.9 3
The law's view of marriage and the married woman has changed
dramatically in the past thirty years. This overview of reforms in the law
of marriage and its surrounding regulatory areas discloses that the
married woman is no longer required to take her legal identity from that
of her husband.94 Rather, she is an independent legal agent with the
power to choose her own role in marriage and to determine how she will
combine that role with her public obligations as a citizen. It remains to
determine whether her new status is accurately reflected in the view of
marriage found in the 2003 federal welfare law.
III. A NEW VISION OF MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE
Towards the end of the thirty year period under discussion, a new
institutional actor entered the arena of divorce reform. The American
Law Institute ("ALI") began planning its project on family dissolution in

88. See DIANA E.H. RUSSELL, RAPE INMARRIAGE 90 (1982).
89. See Rhonda Freeman, Parenting After Divorce: Using Research to Inform DecisionMaking About Children, 15 CAN. J. FAM. L. 79, 97-99 (1998). Freeman quotes a broad definition of
women abuse formulated by women's advocates, mediators, and children's advocates attending the
Toronto Forum on Woman Abuse and Mediation held over a five-day period in May 1992 and
March 1993. Id.at 98 n.71.
90. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 632 (2000) (Souter, J., dissenting) (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted). Quoting from the Congressional findings accompanying the
Violence Against Women Act, Justice Souter directs attention to statistics indicating that "[t]hree
out of four American women will be victims of violent crimes sometime during their life" and that
"[v]iolence is the leading cause of injuries to women ages 15 to 44." Id. at 631 (citations omitted).
91. See id. at 632. "An estimated 4 million American women are battered each year by their
husbands or partners .... Over I million women in the United States seek medical assistance each
year for injuries sustained [from] their husbands or other partners ....Between [two thousand] and
[four thousand] women die every year from [domestic] abuse ....Arrest rates may be as low as
[one] for every [one hundred] domestic assaults." Id.(citations omitted).
92. See Civil Rights Remedies for Gender-Motivated Violence Act, Pub. L. No. 103-322,
Title IV, 108 Stat. 1941, codified at 42 U.S.C. § 13981 (2000).
93. See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 617, 619, 627.
94. See supra notes 30-35 and accompanying text.
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1989, started the drafting process in early 1990, and approved the final
draft of its Principles of Family Dissolution ("Principles")at its May
2000 annual meeting. 95 In addition to path-breaking innovations in
family support, child custody, and property division, the ALI Principles
recognize that family dissolution is not limited to married couples.
Chapter Six creates principles to govern the financial claims of domestic
partners, defined as "two persons of the same or opposite sex, not
married to one another, who for a significant period of time share a
primary residence and a life together as a couple." 96 That such a bold
proposal was put forward by the highly respected
ALI has stimulated
98
97
both media attention and scholarly comment.
The relevance of the ALI Principles to this discussion lies in its
role in expanding the availability of legal remedies to non-traditional
families. To be sure, Chapter Six imposes these remedies on domestic
partners who maintain a common household with their common child for
a specified continuous period of time 99 if they fail to opt out of its
provisions, 100 leading one observer to suggest that this provision is
probably not what most heterosexual cohabitants want.1 °1 Still, the
remedies provided in Chapter Six may hold greater attraction for samesex couples who cannot marry. 0 2 In any event, the ALI approach is

95. See AM. LAW INST., PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS (2002) [hereinafter "ALl PRINCIPLES"].
96. See id.§ 6.01.
97. See Robert Pear, Legal Group Urges States to Update Their Family Law, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 30, 2002, at Al. The first sentence of this account reads: "An influential group of lawyers and
judges has recommended sweeping changes in family law that would increase alimony and property
rights for many divorced women, while extending such rights for the first time to many cohabiting
domestic partners, both heterosexual and gay." Id.
98. Several symposia have been devoted to discussion of the ALI proposals. See, e.g.,
Symposium, American Law Institute's Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution, 4 J. L. & FAM.
STUD. 1 (2002); Symposium, Gender Issues in Divorce: Commentaries on the American Law
Institute's Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution, 8 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL'Y 1, (2001);
Symposium, UnmarriedPartnersand the Legacy of Marvin v. Marvin, 76 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
1261 (2001).
99. See ALL PRINCIPLES, supra'note 95, § 6.03(2).
100. See id. § 6.01(2).
101. See Margaret F. Brinig, Domestic Partnership:Missing the Target? 4 J. L. & FAM STUD.
19, 20 (2002); see also David Westfall, Forcing Incidents of Marriageon Unmarried Cohabitants:
The American Law Institute's Principles of Family Dissolution, 76 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1467,
1470 ("Imposing marital obligations on parties in an informal relationship is wholly at odds with
some of the potentially liberating implications of the Marvin court's decision.")
102. See Mary Coombs, Insiders and Outsiders: What the American Law Institute Has Done
for Gay andLesbianFamilies,8 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL'Y 87, 103 (2001).
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consistent with developments in other
countries that are moving toward
10 3
an expanded definition of marriage.
I agree with a critic who has argued that "the Principles would
change the way we think about marriage."'' 0 4 I do not agree, however,
with her further point that the ALl Principles 'will have the negative
effect of downgrading and diluting marriage. 0 5 Rather, I suggest that the
ALI Principles will have a positive effect on the way we think about
marriage by providing a legal framework that enables couples to design
their family relationships to suit their individual aspirations as they
evolve over time.
To this end, I have proposed elsewhere that we reconceive marriage
as a joint venture: an enterprise undertaken by parties with similar
resources and interests to achieve a particular goal. 0 6 I argued that,
although the joint venture is not an ongoing relationship-a point that
distinguishes it from a partnership-it may be renewed to encompass
subsequent projects.10 7 In implicitly rejecting the traditional ideal of
marriage as a lifelong affiliation indissoluble except by death, I intended
no disrespect for marriage. Rather, I sought its transformation in light of
the unilateral nature of no-fault divorce into an institution with the
capacity to shelter two individuals and their children who value
autonomy and seek to enjoy a shared intimacy for the duration of their
common project.
The emergence of covenant marriage towards the end of the
twentieth century 0 8 and its legislative adoption in at least three states,' 0 9
represents a different approach to marriage. Professor Herbie DiFonzo
' 10
calls it "the newest weapon of the divorce counterrevolution."
Professor Katherine Shaw Spaht, the drafter of the first Covenant
Marriage Act, forcefully charged that, "[l]aw played an indispensable

103. See Grace Ganz Blumberg, The Regularization of Nonmarital Cohabitation:Rights and
Responsibilities in the American Welfare State, 76 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1265, 1281-82 (2000)
(mentioning Denmark; Norway; Sweden; Iceland; Greenland; Netherlands; Catalunya, Spain;
Aragon, Spain; and France).
104. Lynne Marie Kohm, How Will the Proliferation and Recognition of Domestic
PartnershipsAffect Marriage?,4 J. L. & FAM STUD. 105, 106 (2002).
105. See id. at 107.
106. See Kay, supranote 11, at 2089.
107. See id.
108. Louisiana enacted the first Covenant Marriage Act in 1997. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
§§ 9:272-:275.1 (West 2000); Susan Hager, Comment, Nostalgic Attempts to Recapture What Never
Was: Louisiana'sCovenant MarriageAct, 77 NEB. L. REV. 567, 570 (1998).
109. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 25-901-906 (West 2000 & Supp. 2002); ARK. CODE ANN.
§§ 9-11-801-811 (LexisNexis 2002); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 9:272-9:275.1 (West 2000).
110. James Herbie DiFonzo, Customized Marriage,75 IND. L.J. 875, 962 (2000).
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role in the near-destruction of marriage, so surely it can and must in light
of its complicity, contribute to the rehabilitation of marriage-for the
sake of the children.""' Couples who choose covenant marriage in
Louisiana undergo premarital counseling prior to filing a declaration of
intent that "marriage is a covenant between a man and a woman who
agree to live together. . . for so long as they both may live. ' 12They also
agree to take all reasonable efforts to preserve their marriage, including
marital counseling." 3 Divorce is possible only on specified fault-based
14
grounds or on the ground of living separate and apart for two years.

Critics of covenant marriage have shown that one of its chief effects is to
bring back the negative aspects of fault-based divorce law that were
abolished in the no-fault reforms." 5 To date, the percentage of couples
choosing covenant marriage has remained small." 16
Family law in general, and the law of marriage in particular, is at
bottom a codification of a society's attitudes about women. While these
attitudes are far from settled, and great regional variations continue to
exist even within the United States, the developments of the past thirty
years have resulted in a sea change in the social and legal position of
women. Today's women will not easily give up their improved status.
As I observed thirty years ago,
[I]t is frequently remarked that one way of reducing divorce is to
strengthen marriage. And from the point of view of feminists,
marriages are strengthened not merely by family life education,
marriage counseling, and conciliation-useful as these things are-but
rather by restructuring the institution itself so that it may better
accommodate equalitarian relationships. Moreover, if marriage is freer,
divorce should become less punitive. A woman who has maintained
her independence during marriage and who retains the ability to lead
her own life should be better able to recognize an irretrievably broken
marriage and to respond by seeking release on equitable terms. It
remains only for divorce reformers to recognize this new attitude by
111. Katherine Shaw Spaht, Louisiana's Covenant Marriage: Social Analysis and Legal
Implications, 59 LA. L. REV. 63, 70 (1998) (footnote omitted).
112. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:273(A)(1) (West 2000).
113. See id.
114.

See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:307 (West 2000).

115. See Jeanne Louise Carriere, "It's Deja Vu All Over Again ": The Covenant MarriageAct
in Popular Cultural Perception and Legal Reality, 72 TuL. L. REV. 1701, 1721 (1998); Amy L.
Stewart, Note, Covenant Marriage: Legislating Family Values, 32 IND. L. REV. 509, 527 (1999).
116. See Ira Mark Ellman, Divorce Rates, MarriageRates, and the Problematic Persistence of
Traditional Marital Roles, 34 FAM. L.Q. 1, 15 (noting that "[t]he two states adopting covenant
marriage [at that time only Louisiana and Arizona] have found that their constituents have had little
interest in it ....
).
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giving up fault-finding and punitive financial and custodial provisions
in favor of an approach that will allow both spouses to separate,
perhaps with regret, but it is hoped without rancor. 17

117.

Kay, supranote 18, at 1696.

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2003

21

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 32, Iss. 1 [2003], Art. 4

https://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol32/iss1/4

22

